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INTRODUCTION 
The recent United States Supreme Court opinion in Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit1 is critical to 
parties and attorneys who participate in environmental litigation. 
Leatherman proscribed the imposition of pleading requirements that 
are stricter than those ordinarily applied under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a). Such heightened pleading requirements compel 
plaintiffs to plead more facts, and courts can dismiss claims that fall 
short of the mark. 
The Leatherman court considered civil rights actions alleging that 
municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Although 
Leatherman might seem of limited relevance to environmental law-
suits, its holding and reasoning appear sufficiently broad to encom-
pass environmental litigation. 3 Numerous federal circuit and 
district courts have recently required that plaintiffs plead with par-
ticularity in environmental actions, principally cases pursued under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCl.A).4 Leatherman may prohibit elevated plead-
ing in environmental litigation. This article analyzes whether the 
Supreme Court has proscribed heightened pleading in environmen-
tal lawsuits in Leatherman and the consequences of that prohibition. 
Part I examines the origins and development of elevated pleading 
requirements in certain types of cases. This Part considers the rise 
of heightened pleading in civil rights actions and its extension to 
environmental suits, emphasizing the leading case of Cash Energy v. 
Weiner. 5 Part II evaluates the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Leatherman and finds that the decision is expansive enough to 
include environmental actions. The final Part assesses Leatherman's 
implications for environmental litigation. 
i 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). 
2 Id. at 1161. Leatherman has been applied by courts in subsequent 
environmental cases. See Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon Products, 820 F. 
Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to apply heightened pleading 
standards in CERCLA case). In an unreported opinion, another court applied 
Leatherman to defeat a heightened pleading request in a case seeking recovery 
for hazardous waste cleanup costs. PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, No. 93-C-
1379, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9286, at *9 (N.D. Ill.July 7, 1993). 
3 See WmwickAdmin. Group, 820 F. Supp. at 120; PMC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9286, at *9. 
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1990). 
5 768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991). 
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I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ELEVATED PLEADING 
A. The Adoption of Ru/,e 8 and the Imposition of E/euated P/,eading in 
Civil Rights Cases 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which governs pleading, 
requires that a plaintiff submit a "short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. "6 The members 
of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules that suggested this 
Rule in 1938 intended the rule to clarify and simplify prior common 
law and code pleading while deemphasizing the importance of the 
pleadings.7 During the mid-1950s, the Civil Rules Committee 
refused to implement recommendations of judges in the Ninth Cir-
cuit that would have revived earlier forms of pleading. No substan-
tive recommendations for change in pleading have been adopted.8 
The Supreme Court subscribed to the flexible, liberal pleading 
system incorporated in the Federal Rules, sta~ng in Conley v. Gibson 
that a "[c]omplaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief. "9 The Court, therefore, repudiated fact pleading and 
adopted notice pleading. The Court stated that the Rules required 
only "a short and plain statement of the claim" to give the defendant 
fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and its grounds. Io 
Although the Supreme Court opinion in Conley might have 
seemed to sound the death knell for pleading practice, defendants 
persisted in filing motions to dismiss and judges continued granting 
them. I I Since the 1970s, many judges have demanded stricter 
pleading of plaintiffs bringing specific types of suits. The preemi-
6 FED. R CIV. P. 8(a). If plaintiffs complaint does not satisfy Rule 8, 
defendant can file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). I rely substantially 
in this subsection on Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pl.eading Under the 
Federal Ruf.es of Civil Procedure, 86 Co LUM. L. REv. 433 ( 1986); Carl To bias, Public 
Law Litigation and the Federal Ruf.es of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 
296-301 (1989). 
7 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 439-40; David M. Roberts, Fact P/.eading, Notice 
Pl.eading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 396 (1980). 
s See Marcus, supra note 6, at 445; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Ruf.es of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. 
PA. L. REv. 909, 983-84 (1987). 
9 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted). 
IO Id. at 47. See generally Marcus, supra note 6, at 442-46 (discussing 
encouragement of flexible pleading practices by federal courts). 
I I See Marcus, supra note 6, at 434. 
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nent examples are civil rights cases. As early as 1984, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pro-
claimed that all of the circuit courts had "articulated a requirement 
of particularity in pleading for civil rights complaints."12 Courts' 
requirements differ substantially, especially in the specificity 
demanded.13 
B. Elevated Pkading in Areas Other than Environmental Cases 
Federal courts have required heightened pleading primarily in 
civil rights cases.14 Nonetheless, judges have recently extended the 
concept to other substantive areas, for two major reasons. First, the 
escalating expense of litigation has made the threat of false claims 
or defenses powerful weapons of intimidation, increasing the temp-
tation to invoke them. 15 Second, judges have been concerned that 
additional frivolous claims or defenses impair the system-wide qual-
ity of justice, particularly in light of the litigation explosion.16 
Important fields in which judges have expanded heightened plead-
ing include securities, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO), Federal Torts Claims Act, and antitrust 
Ii ligation. 17 
12 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 
1084 (1985); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751F.2d1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985). 
13 The majority and specially concurring opinions of Judge Goldberg in 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 
954 F.2d 1054, 1055, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), review much relevant case law. Two 
circuits seem to have opposed heightened pleading. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 
F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992); Karim-Panahi 
v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Branch 
v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991). 
14 See Cash Energy v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D. Mass. 1991). See 
generally Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pl.eading 
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 935 (1990) 
(analyzing heightened pleading requirements for civil rights actions); Tobias, 
supra note 6, at 297-301 (discussing heightened pleading requirement, its effect 
on civil rights litigants); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pl.eading Rul.e for Civil Rights 
Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677 (1984) (discussing 
imposition of stricter pleading requirements for civil rights cases). 
15 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898; accord United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 
F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 946 (1980). 
16 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898; accord Sutliff Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 
648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984). 
17 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898-99 (discussing other areas and relevant cases). 
See generally Marcus, supra note 6, at 439; Tobias, supra note 6, at 296-301. 
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C. El£vated Pleading in Environmental Cases 
1. Weiner 
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Since the 1980s, many federal judges have imposed elevated 
pleading in environmental cases, most of which involved CERClA. 18 
Cash Energy v. Weiner is important, because Judge Robert E. Keeton, 
its author, comprehensively treated numerous relevant issues. Kee-
ton then served as Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (Standing Committee) of the Judicial Conference, which 
has substantial responsibility for revision of all Federal Rules. 19 
Given Weiner's thorough analysis and its author's role in the civil 
procedure area, a close examination of the decision enhances 
understanding of the issues posed by heightened pleading 
requirements. 
Judge Keeton in Weiner fully reviewed the pertinent history of the 
requirement that plaintiffs plead with particularity.20 Judge Keeton 
first acknowledged the flexible, liberal pleading regime created in 
the original 1938 Rules. He recognized that the Supreme Court had 
stamped its imprimatur on this system and on notice pleading in 
Conley.21 Judge Keeton observed, however, that even the Federal 
Rules sow the "seeds of a countervailing tendency. "22 He specifically 
invoked Rule 9 (b), which expressly requires particularized pleading 
in cases involving fraud and mistake; Rule 8(£), which provides that 
pleadings are to be interpreted to promote substantial justice; and 
18 A few of the cases involved other environmental statutes, such as the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988). See, 
e.g., McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 856 F.2d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 
(N.D. Ind. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1992). 
19 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897-900. The Standing Committee is a 
thirteen-member body comprised of federal judges, law professors, and 
practitioners, which Congress has authorized to study the Federal Rules and to 
formulate proposals for change as needed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. 1993). 
See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rul.e 15(c) and Its 
Lessons for Civil Rul.es Revision, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1507 (1987) (discussing rule 
revision entities); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal 
Discuvery and the Politics of Rul.emaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 797 n.2 (1991) 
(citing sources that discuss composition and role of Advisory Committee). 
20 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897-99; see also supra notes 6-13 and 
accompanying text (similar history). 
21 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ); 
see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (similar history). 
22 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897. 
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Rule 12(e), which prescribes motions for more definite statements 
and the possibility of striking deficient pleadings.23 
Judge Keeton remarked that courts needed the elevated require-
ments for pleading fraud under Rule 9(b) to help prevent abuse of 
legal processes. 24 Moreover, courts have extended this exception 
for fraud to similar statutory causes of action because analogous 
considerations apply. 25 Courts have also created new exceptions in 
fields that present compelling reasons for elevated pleading. 
Finally, Keeton stated that courts demand particularity in pleading 
to promote substantial justice and to address due process concerns 
over a plaintiff's request for a drastic remedy.26 
Judge Keeton in Weiner explained that the imposition of height-
ened pleading in civil rights cases was a response to litigants filing 
unfounded claims. 27 He found that courts have increasingly 
required particularity because of fears about false claims and 
defenses and the threat that frivolous litigation poses for the federal 
court system.28 He also observed that these concerns had fostered 
the 1983 amendments to Rules 11 and 26 that place enhanced 
responsibilities upon lawyers and parties for the representations that 
they make in pleadings and in discovery papers. 29 
Judge Keeton summarized this history by stating that the pleading 
strictures have become less forgiving, that judges have demanded 
particularity more frequently, and that courts have permitted 
reduced discovery before requiring that pleaders allege sufficient 
facts to "support a claim on which relief can be granted or a defense 
23 Id.; see also FED. R Crv. P. 9(b), 8(£), 12(e). 
24 Wein~'" 768 F. Supp. at 897. 
25 Id.; see also id. at 898-99 (citing securities, RICO, and labor litigation and 
relevant case authority). See generally Marcus, supra note 6, at 450-55 (noting 
heightened pleading requirements for conspiracy allegations). 
26 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898-99; accurd United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 
F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text 
(discussing promoting substantial justice). 
27 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897-98. But see Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 
532 F.2d 920, 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons,]., dissenting); Wingate, supra 
note 14, at 688. 
28 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898; see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying 
text. 
29 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 899. See generally Carl Tobias, Ru/,e 11 and Civil 
Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 485 (1988-89) [hereafter Tobias, Ru/,e 11] 
(criticizing chilling effect of Rule 11 on civil rights litigation); Carl Tobias, 
judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rul.es, 43 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 933, 940-42, 946-48 (1991) [hereafter Tobias, Discretion] (discussing how 
Rules 11 and 26 disadvantage civil rights litigants). 
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on which judgment can be entered. "30 Judge Keeton candidly 
acknowledged the danger that this trend could be extended too far, 
and recognized the need to strike an appropriate balance among 
the various relevant interests.31 He contended that an elevated stan-
dard should thwart frivolous allegations while providing parties 
access to the information they need to prove their cases. 32 
In a concluding paragraph, Judge Keeton asked whether CERCLA 
was another field in which courts would demand heightened plead-
ing. 33 Keeton observed that CERCLA was difficult to analogize to 
fraud. Even so, he stated that CERCLA implicates numerous factors 
that prompt judges to require stricter pleading in cases other than 
fraud. 34 The most significant factor for Judge Keeton was the great 
expense of defending against a non-meritorious claim. He argued 
that particularized pleading would limit meritless claims.35 Keeton, 
therefore, found it reasonable to predict that higher courts would 
extend elevated pleading requirements to CERCLA litigation, and 
would apply certain ameliorating factors to protect plaintiffs who 
need discovery. 36 
The principal difficulty with the Weiner opinion is that Judge Kee-
ton premised his decision almost exclusively on public policy consid-
erations relevant to the litigation explosion, abuses of the litigation 
process, and litigation costs.37 The opinion did not allude to other 
policy factors, namely clear congressional intent to clean up the 
30 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 899-900. See generally Tobias, Ruk 11, supra note 
29, at 495-98 (discussing judicial application of Rule 11 in civil rights cases, 
procedural difficulties civil rights litigants confront). 
31 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 900; see also New England Data Services v. Becher, 
829 F.2d 286, 291 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting need to strike balance among 
conflicting interests, including plaintiffs' need for discovery). 
32 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 900. See generally Tobias, Ruk 11, supra note 29, 
at 495-98 (discussing civil rights plaintiffs' access problems); Carl Tobias, Ruk 
11 Reconsidered, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 867, 876, 891, 897 (1992) (discussing 
balancing of interests considered in Rule 11 reform). 
33 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 900. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. Keeton also mentioned that the "consequences of individual liability 
for an environmental violation may be severe." Id. 
36 Id. The court so ruled, "[u]nless and until guidance to the contrary 
appears in legislation or precedent." Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying 
text. 
37 See, e.g., supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra 
note 6, at 287-89 (discussing litigation explosion and litigation abuse and citing 
relevant secondary authority). 
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environment, as expressed in the CERCIA statutory scheme.38 
These considerations are at least as relevant as the factors that Kee-
ton considered.39 The Weiner case also mentioned no opinions 
involving the environment,40 although Judge Keeton examined a 
wealth of precedent requiring particularized pleading in a number 
of substantive fields of law.41 
2. Additional Relevant Cases 
a. Cases Imposing Elevated Pl.eading 
Numerous federal district judges have required elevated pleading 
in CERCIA and other environmental cases. For example, a North-
ern District of Indiana judge stated that a Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) complaint must include allegations 
regarding every material element of each asserted claim. This judge 
found deficient a pleading that contained only bare legal conclu-
sions attached to narrated facts.42 Judges in the District of Colorado 
and the Southern District of New York have similarly found that 
pleadings including conclusory allegations that merely track CER-
CIA' s language are insufficient.43 
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in McGregor v. Industrial Excess Land.fil~ held that plaintiffs must 
specifically allege in complaints "either the costs they incurred ... 
or the actions they took in response to the allegedly hazardous con-
ditions. "44 The Middle District of Pennsylvania applied this ruling 
38 The major purpose of CERCLA is to clean up hazardous waste sites. See, 
e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1237 
(M.D. Pa. 1990); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.NJ. 1983). 
39 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
40 Quite a few existed, however, at the time that Judge Keeton issued Weiner. 
See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338 
(N.D. Ind. 1991); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 
1991); see also infra notes 42-52, 63-65 and accompanying text. 
41 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898-99; see also supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
42 See Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. at 1340. But cf CBS v. Henkin, 803 F. 
Supp. 1426, 1432 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (rejecting elevated pleading in CERCLA 
cases). 
43 See Cook, 755 F. Supp. at 1475; Bradley Indus. Park v. Xerox Corp., No. 88 
CIV. 7574 (CSH), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1492, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1991). 
44 See McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 856 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 
1988). 
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in Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc. 45 The district judge in Ambrogi provided 
comparatively expansive treatment of several issues relevant to ele-
vated pleading. 
The court in Ambrogi analogized to Third Circuit civil rights 
cases46 and invoked policy concepts, articulated in Weiner, that seek 
to protect defendants from meritless litigation. 47 The judge in 
Ambrogi declared that the large number of environmental actions 
could not justify the imposition of heightened pleading,48 but that 
particularity in pleading would help eliminate frivolous claims and 
distinguish federal causes of action from state tort claims. Height-
ened pleading requirements would also give defendants adequate 
notice of plaintiffs' claims, thus permitting defendants to formulate 
appropriate responses. 49 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, followed a different approach in Ascon Properties v. Mobil Oil 
Co.50 In Ascon Properties, the court distinguished the Sixth Circuit's 
McGregor holding on its facts. 51 The Ninth Circuit imposed a slightly 
elevated requirement in CERCLA cases by stating that a "claimant 
must allege at least one type of 'response' cost cognizable under 
CERCLA [in order] to make out a prima fade case. "52 
b. Cases &jecting El,euated Pl.eading 
Several judges have held that heightened pleading is not required 
in CERCLA cases. Judges in the Northern District of New York and 
in the Western District of New York observed that a CERCLA plain-
45 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1251-53 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
46 The Third Circuit has a reputation as the foremost proponent of elevated 
pleading in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (requiring plaintiffs in civil rights cases to plead facts 
with specificity); Marcus, supra note 6, at 449 (noting Third Circuit is leader in 
movement to impose elevated pleading); see also Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1251-
52 (discussing pleading sufficiency). 
47 For instance, the Ambrogi court subscribed to the idea that elevated 
pleading "serves to protect . . . defendants who would be unduly burdened 
defending frivolous actions." Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1252; see also Weiner, 768 
F. Supp. at 897-98; supra notes 15-16, 27-28 and accompanying text. 
48 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1252. But cf. supra notes 27-28 and accompanying 
text (noting that large number of frivolous civil rights claims is often cited as 
justification for elevated pleading). 
49 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1252. 
so 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989). 
51 Id. at 1156; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (providing Sixth 
Circuit holding). 
s2 Ascon Properties, 866 F.2d at 1154. 
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tiff need not plead that it incurred particular costs. If the plaintiff 
alleges that it has incurred and will continue to incur expenses and 
costs, that pleading would suffice.53 A Connecticut district judge 
relied on these two opinions to hold that a plaintiff must allege that 
it incurred response costs but is not required to particularize those 
expenses.54 The Connecticut court also distinguished the Sixth Cir-
cuit's McGregor holding on its facts and remarked that the plaintiff 
had afforded the defendant fair notice of plaintiff's claim and the 
grounds on which it rested.55 
A Northern District of Indiana judge refused to apply heightened 
pleading for similar reasons. This court distinguished Weiner 
because the plaintiff's pleadings accorded the defendant adequate 
notice of plaintiff's legal theory.56 Moreover, the judge stated that 
numerous courts have held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, 
not Federal Rule 9, governs pleading in CERCl.A litigation. 57 
Additional federal district judges have expressly or implicitly 
rejected heightened pleading under CERCl.A. For example, one 
judge in the Maryland District declined to require that CERCl.A 
plaintiffs plead with particularity analogous to Rule 9(b)'s require-
ments.58 This court also stated that it would "continue to hold CER-
Cl.A claims to the traditional pleading standards embodied in Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)."59 The judge specifically rejected defendant's 
suggestion that it base elevated pleading on Weiner. 60 A Northern 
District of New York judge, writing before Weiner, similarly refused 
to impose heightened pleading.61 This court declared that the 
defendant had not submitted, nor had the judge discovered, any 
53 See Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 713, 717 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 298 
(N.D.N.Y 1984). 
54 See Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 
1243 (D. Conn. 1992). 
55 Id. at 1243-44; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing 
treatment of costs in McGregor). 
56 CBS v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1426, 1432 (N.D. Ind. 1992). But cf. 
Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 
(N.D. Ind. 1991) (imposing elevated pleading in RCRA case). 
57 Henkin, 803 F. Supp. at 1432. The court cited two cases treated below. See 
infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. One case similar to Henkin is 
Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1990). See also infra 
note 64 and accompanying text. 
58 United States v. Azrael, 774 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Md. 1991). 
59 Id. at 379 n.6. 
60 Id. 
61 Stilloe v. Almy Bros., 759 F. Supp. 95, 104-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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rule or case authority to support an argument that CERClA cases 
"must be pied with greater specificity than is required under Fed. R. 
Civ. Proc. S(a)."62 
A New Hampshire District Court judge proclaimed that the Fed-
eral Rules do not require specificity in CERClA pleadings. This 
judge flatly rejected defendant's contention that the court dismiss 
plaintiff's CERClA claim for failing to specify certain response 
costs. 63 A Northern District of Illinois judge acknowledged that the 
CERClA test for holding corporate individuals liable is very fact-
specific. This judge, however, held that the Federal Rules' pleading 
strictures do not "compel the specification of such facts in the 
complaint. "64 
In sum, a growing number of federal judges have required that 
plaintiffs plead with particularity in environmental cases, especially 
those involving CERClA. 65 The Weiner case is representative of this 
trend, and provides analysis of many issues important to the imposi-
tion of elevated pleading. The Supreme Court's resolution of the 
heightened pleading issue in civil rights suits against municipalities 
also provides relevant analysis. This article next turns to the 
Leatherman opinion to examine its arguments against elevated 
pleading. 
II. ANALYSIS OF LEATHERMAN 
A. Leatherman 
In Leatherman, the Supreme Court held that federal courts could 
not impose a pleading standard more stringent than the pleading 
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983.66 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected the 
argument that normal pleading would expose municipalities to time 
consuming and costly discovery in all such actions, disrupting 
municipal functions and emasculating municipal immunity.67 He 
62 Id. at 104. 
63 Mesiti v. Microdot, 739 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D.N.H. 1989); accord New York v. 
Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
64 Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
65 See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text. 
66 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination 
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1161 (1993). 
67 Id. at 1162. Numerous federal courts had relied on the disruption of 
municipal functions rationale in imposing elevated pleading. See, e.g., Jones v. 
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obseived that the contention improperly equated freedom from lia-
bility with immunity from suit. He also stated that municipalities do 
not possess absolute or qualified immunity under Section 1983. 
Municipalities could thus be found liable when their customs or pol-
icies cause the alleged constitutional injuries, regardless of the 
pleading standard. 68 
Rehnquist's opinion also refuted the suggestion that "heightened 
pleading" was a misnomer, because the degree of particularity that 
the Federal Rules requires varies with the complexity of the applica-
ble substantive law.69 The Court instead found elevated pleading 
well-named. Enhanced pleading requirements demand more to 
plead a complaint under Section 1983 than to plead other kinds of 
claims for relief. 70 
The Supreme Court then declared that it was impossible to recon-
cile heightened pleading with the liberal notice pleading system in 
the Federal Rules. 71 Chief Justice Rehnquist included a pair of clas-
sic, often-cited quotations from Conl,ey v. Gibson72 to defend notice 
pleading: 
Rule 8(a) (2) requires that a complaint include only "a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief." In Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect that the rule meant 
what it said: "(T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require 
a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 
claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a 'short and plain 
statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of 
what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."73 
The Supreme Court next stated that Rule 9 (b) requires particu-
larized pleading for fraud and mistake.74 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
remarked that the Federal Rules proscribe enhanced pleading 
requirements for certain claims. The Rules fail to include among 
these enumerated actions lawsuits against municipalities alleging lia-
bility under Section 1983. Therefore, following the maxim expressio 
Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1980). 
68 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162. 
69 Id. 
10 Id. at 1162-63. 
71 Id. at 1163; see al.so supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. 
72 355 U.S. 41 (1957); see al.so Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; supra notes 9-10 
and accompanying text (discussing Conley). 
73 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163 (citations omitted) (quoting Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
74 Id.; see al.so FED. R Cw. P. 9(b). 
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unius est exclusio alterius,75 the Federal Rules do not impose height-
ened pleading for actions apart from fraud and mistake. 76 
The Supreme Court obseived that claims which seek to impose 
liability on municipalities for asserted constitutional violations of 
their employees' rights dated from its 1961 opinion in Monell v. New 
York City Department of Social Services, 77 which construed Section 1983 
to permit liability. 78 The Court suggested that Section 1983 litiga-
tion might be included in the list of claims subject to particularized 
pleading in Rule 9(b) if Federal Rules 8 and 9 were dfafted today.79 
Rehnquist claimed, however, that this result must be secured 
through the rule revision process, rather than by judicial construc-
tion. 80 Without a Federal Rules amendment, Rehnquist stated that 
district courts and parties must depend on motions for summary 
judgment and control of discovery to eliminate meritless cases 
sooner in the litigation process.81 
The Supreme Court properly rejected elevated pleading in 
Leatherman because that requirement violated the letter and spirit of 
the Federal Rules' pleading regime, additional features of the Rules, 
and other pronouncements of the Supreme Court.82 Federal judges 
thus lack the authority to demand stricter pleading in civil rights 
75 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius translates 
as "the .expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACKS LAw 
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). See generally SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST.§ 47.23 
(5th ed. 1992) (discussing use of phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius). 
76 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. 
77 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. 
78 See Monel~ 436 U.S. at 689-91; Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. 
79 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
so Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. The Supreme Court applied virtually 
identical phrasing and reasoning to its treatment of Rules 19 and 24 in Martin 
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 767 (1989). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Rights 
Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801, 802-03 (1992) (discussing Martin v. 
Wilks). 
81 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see also Marcus, supra note 6, at 439-40 
(discussing cited argument); accord Tobias, supra note 6, at 300. New proposals 
to amend certain discovery provisions in the Federal Rules would afford judges 
greater control over discovery. See Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 30(a) (2), 33(a) 
(Sept. 1992). See generally Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 
145 F.RD. 139 (1993) (examining conflicting procedural reform efforts); 
Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Ref<nm, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263 (1992) 
(discussing proposed amendments to rules regarding pretrial discovery). 
82 See Marcus, supra note 6; Tobias, supra note 6. 
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actions.83 The Federal Rules' drafters provided for heightened 
pleading only in Rule 9(b) and refused to impose elevated require-
ments and fact pleading when recommending Rule 8 in 1938.84 
Subsequent rule revisions altered none of these original standards.85 
Federal Rules amendments have preserved a flexible, pragmatic 
scheme of pleading intended to serve limited purposes. When 
judges dismiss civil rights actions at the pleading phase in the belief 
that plaintiffs will not succeed on the merits, the judges effectively 
require litigants to assemble evidence before they have taken discov-
ery. That requirement contravenes traditional wisdom regarding 
the information that plaintiffs are required to produce and that 
judges may consider at this stage.86 
The Supreme Court in Leatherman properly suggested that federal 
trial judges and parties could employ other procedures to eliminate 
meritless actions. 87 For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed 
that judges and litigants can invoke summary judgment under Rule 
56 and rely upon provisions in the discovery rules to "weed out 
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later."88 Judges can apply 
other mechanisms, such as Rule 16 procedures for pretrial confer-
ences. Judges may seek guidance from the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, which enjoys a reputation for its use of Rule 16 to resolve 
disputes promptly.89 Judges and parties might also employ meas-
83 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 
(5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring); Rotolo v. Borough of 
Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, j., dissenting). 
84 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. 
85 See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d at 1482 (Higginbotham, J., concurring); 
United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certain-Teed Prods., 426 F.2d 539, 542-43 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 ( 1970); Thompson v. Village of Evergreen 
Park, 503 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Ill. 1980); FED. R. Cw. P. 9(b); Wingate, supra 
note 14, at 692. 
86 See, e.g., Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 
1982) ("We are at a loss as to how any plaintiff ... is supposed to allege with 
specificity prior to discovery acts to which he or she personally was not exposed 
.... ");Hill v. City of Atlanta, 91 F.R.D. 528, 532 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Marcus, supra 
note 6, at 462-71. · 
87 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see also Tobias, supra note 6, at 300. This 
assumes that plaintiffs pursue too many meritless civil rights actions, a 
contention challenged by some. See, e.g., &tow, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting); Wingate, supra note 14, at 688. 
88 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see also supra note 81 and accompanying 
text. 
89 See FED. R. Cw. P. 16; see also Charles R. Richey, Ru/.e 16 Revisited: Reflections 
for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525 (1992). See generally Tobias, supra 
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ures covering, for example, case management and discovery under 
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.90 
The imposition of stricter pleading in civil rights litigation has sig-
nificant consequences for plaintiffs. Heightened pleading contra-
venes precepts of basic fairness by demanding that some litigants 
satisfy more burdensome requirements without justification. Strin-
gent pleading revives the repudiated notion of fact pleading and 
applies the rejected idea of "disfavored claims"91 to a class oflawsuits 
that the Supreme Court has declared is fundamental to liberty.92 
Elevated pleading also imposes onerous duties on a category of 
parties who have limited ability to fulfill them. For example, numer-
ous civil rights plaintiffs have relatively few resources and compara-
tively little access to information relevant to their cases. Stricter 
pleading rules will require that they include information in their 
complaints which they lack the time or money to obtain or can 
secure only through discovery.93 Finally, practically all of the factors 
reviewed above apply to environmental litigation. Lower courts 
should apply Leatherman to proscribe heightened pleading in envi-
ronmental litigation. 
note 6, at 291-92 (noting Rule 16's ability to increase district courts' power to 
manage litigation); Tobias, Discretion, supra note 29, at 942-46 (same). For 
analysis of the Eastern District of Virginia and its expeditious dispute 
resolution, see Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Vi?ginia, 26 
U.S.F. L. REv. 445 (1992). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform in the 
Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 89, 98-99 (1993) (discussing district's 
refusal to modify stringent control over civil docket). 
90 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992)). See generally Linda S. 
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375 
( 1992) (criticizing Civil Justice Reform Act's redistribution of procedural rule-
making power and impairment of federal courts' ability to control civil 
litigation); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992) 
(discussing civil justice reform in each federal government branch). 
Numerous courts had implemented some of these and other techniques 
through local rules. See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager: 
The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 770-
89 (1981). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform and the Bal.kaniz.ation of 
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARiz. ST. LJ. 1393, 1396-99 (1992) (discussing 
managerial judging and its codification by Federal Rules amendments). 
91 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 4 71-73; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical 
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988). 
92 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
93 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 6, at 300-01; Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 29, at 
495-98. 
372 University of California, Davis [Vol. 27:357 
B. Applicability of Leatherman to Environmental Cases 
Whether Leatherman prohibits enhanced pleading in environmen-
tal litigation is not obvious from the Court's opinion. Leatherman 
proscribes heightened pleading for civil rights actions against a 
municipality. Moreover, the Court did not purport to address the 
imposition of elevated pleading in other types of lawsuits. The opin-
ion stated that the case provided no occasion to examine whether 
the Court's "qualified immunity jurisprudence would require 
heightened pleading in cases involving individual government offi-
cials. "94 The Court, accordingly, may have been suggesting that it 
was leaving open for future resolution whether courts could require 
heightened pleading in other actions. 
Nonetheless, the Court would probably reject elevated pleading 
in environmental litigation, if faced with a case presenting this issue. 
Many of the rationales that the Court employed in Leatherman apply 
to environmental lawsuits. For example, heightened pleading in 
environmental actions conflicts with the Rules' liberal, flexible 
scheme of notice pleading.95 Environmental cases, like civil rights 
litigation, also do not involve fraud or mistake, so that Rule 9(b) 
does not require particularity in pleading.96 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court, following Leatherman, would probably find that 
courts can only require particularized pleading in environmental 
lawsuits with an amendment to Rule 9(b), not through judicial con-
struction. Thus, courts and parties must depend on summary judg-
ment and control of discovery to resolve frivolous environmental 
actions earlier in the litigation process.97 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF LEAr.HERMAN's APPLICATION To 
ENVIRONMENTAL CAsES 
Federal judges should apply the holding and underlying ratio-
nales in Leatherman to environmental litigation. Plaintiffs who pur-
sue environmental cases should not have to satisfy heightened 
pleading requirements. Such requirements effectively revive fact 
94 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination 
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993). 
95 Id. at 1163; see a/,so supra notes 6-10, 71 and accompanying text. 
96 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see a/,so FED. R. Cw. P. 9(b); supra notes 
74-76 and accompanying text. Moreover, few environmental cases implicate 
the liability of municipalities or their employees. 
97 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; supra notes 79-81 and accompanying 
text. 
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pleading that the Civil Rules Committee rejected when drafting the 
original Federal Rules.98 Judges should demand that these plaintiffs 
only meet Rule S's notice pleading requirements. Notice pleading 
was intended to be liberal and general, and judges should flexibly 
and practically enforce these pleading requirements.99 
Therefore, judges should rarely grant motions to dismiss when 
defendants argue that environmental plaintiffs have not pied suffi-
cient facts. Judges should also grant plaintiffs leave to amend their 
pleadings or to refile. 10° For instance, the Western District of New 
York in Alluy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc. permitted the 
plaintiff to amend its complaint to include the dates response costs 
were incurred. 101 The New Jersey District Court judge in United 
States v. Price dismissed some of plaintiff's CERCIA claims without 
prejudice.102 A Northern District of Texas judge allowed plaintiffs 
to replead, even though the judge sharply criticized the papers that 
plaintiffs initially filed. 103 
Judges should also recognize that a number of environmental 
plaintiffs, such as local citizens' groups and homeowners' associa-
tions, may possess comparatively limited resources and lack access to 
important material for pleading and proving their cases.104 Judges, 
thus, should not dismiss these plaintiffs' suits early in the litigation. 
Judges should facilitate plaintiffs' discovery by, for instance, liberally 
granting plaintiffs' discovery requests so that litigants can have an 
opportunity to prove their claims. In short,judges should be solici-
tous of the needs of environmental plaintiffs. Congress has indi-
98 See supra notes 6-10, 71 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 6-10, 71-73 and accompanying text. 
lOO See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 
(1962); United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 316 (1960); FED. R CIV. P. 15. 
See generally Lewis, supra note 19, at 1511-39 (reviewing history of Rule 15(c) 
and its application to relation back principle in diversity and federal question 
cases). 
101 See Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 713, 717-18 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
102 See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.NJ. 1983); supra 
note 38 and accompanying text. 
103 See Collin County v. HA.V.E.N., 654 F. Supp. 943, 952-54 (N.D. Tex. 
1987). 
104 See Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rul.e 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 429, 453-57 (1992). Plaintiffs in some CERCIA cases may have substantial 
resources. See, e.g., CBS v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ind. 1992). See 
generally Tobias, Rul.e 11, supra note 29, at 495-98 (noting that characteristics of 
civil rights cases, including parties' resource disparities, make litigants and 
counsel vulnerable to Rule 11 sanction motions). 
374 University of California, Davis [Vol. 27:357 
cated in substantive, procedural and fee-shifting legislation that 
these types of plaintiffs should receive favorable judicial treatment, 
because they vindicate the statutory purpose of cleaning up the 
·environment. 105 
Judges and environmental defendants should also invoke meas-
ures that respond to concerns otherwise addressed by elevated 
pleading requirements. 106 Judges and defendants should employ 
traditional devices, such as motions for summary judgment under 
Rule 56 and the discovery provisions of Rules 26 through 37, to 
eliminate frivolous or weak cases early in the litigation. 107 Judges 
and defendants can also rely on relatively new techniques, namely 
the prescriptions in Federal Rule 16 and the procedures that district 
courts are implementing under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990.108 
CONCLUSION 
A number of federal judges have imposed heightened pleading 
requirements on environmental plaintiffs since the mid-1980s, par-
ticularly on plaintiffs pursuing CERCLA actions. The Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Leatherman proscribes elevated pleading 
in civil rights cases against municipalities. The holding and reason-
ing in that opinion appear applicable to environmental cases. Fed-
eral judges, therefore, should cease demanding that environmental 
plaintiffs satisfy stricter pleading requirements and should only 
require that they satisfy the general, flexible notice pleading regime 
of the Federal Rules embodied in Rule 8. 
105 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(i), 9622 (Supp. 1990) (providing examples of 
provisions for intervention and settlement in CERCLA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(Supp. 1990) (providing examples of provisions for citizen suits and fee 
shifting in Clean Water Act). See generally Tobias, Discretion, supra note 29, at 
962 (suggesting similar ideas regarding civil rights litigation). 
106 See, e.g., Cash Energy v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D. Mass. 1991); 
Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1251-52 (M.D. Pa. 1990); see supra 
notes 15-16, 27, 47, 49 and accompanying text. 
107 See FED. R Cw. P. 26-37, 56; supra notes 81, 87-88 and accompanying 
text. 
108 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
